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CLOSE ENCOUNTERS WITH PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL
RICHARD A. BOOTH*
WHEN I sat down to choose an article from the sixty-year history ofthe Villanova Law Review (VLR) upon which to reflect, I decided the
best way to do so was to find the most influential article in an area I knew
something about.  So I went to Lexis to look for VLR pieces cited by the
Supreme Court.  My search turned up just one such article—which was
surprising.  But the Supreme Court is famously hostile to legal scholarship.
Still, it turned out that the one case I found was a case I knew pretty well
and in more ways than one: United States v. Bestfoods.1
Incidentally, my search was flawed.  According to The Bluebook, the
proper abbreviation for VLR when cited is “Vill. L. Rev.”2  But it turns out
that the Supreme Court has cited VLR many times—incorrectly—without
the proper spaces in the abbreviation: “Vill.L.Rev.” and at least once by
spelling out Villanova.  Lexis is quite literal about such things.  So none of
these many other citations was listed in my search results.3  That is what we
* Martin G. McGuinn Chair in Business Law and Professor of Law, Villanova
University Charles Widger School of Law.
1. 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
2. THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 466 tbl.T.13 (Columbia
Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 19th ed. 2010).
3. I should note that it is only because Amy Spare of the VLS Library heard
my preliminary presentation of this paper at a faculty lunch that I was set straight.
For the record, VLR has been cited more than ten other times by the Supreme
Court.  Thanks again to Amy Spare for this tidbit. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559, 576 n.23 (1996) (citing David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview:
Functions, Problems and Reform, 39 VILL. L. REV. 363, 387 (1994)); Herrera v. Collins,
506 U.S. 390, 408 (1993) (citing Lester B. Orfield, New Trial in Federal Criminal
Cases, 2 VILL. L. REV. 293, 304 (1957)); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 n.17
(1987) (citing Douglas J. Besharov, The Legal Aspects of Reporting Known and Sus-
pected Child Abuse and Neglect, 23 VILL. L. REV. 458, 508–12 (1978)); Solorio v.
United States, 483 U.S. 435, 444 nn.8 & 12 (1987) (citing Comment, 15 VILL. L.
REV. 712, 718 n.38, 719 (1970)); City of Newport v. Iacobucci, 479 U.S. 92, 101
(1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Recent Developments—Constitutional Law, 19
VILL. L. REV. 177, 185 (1973)); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 769 n.3 (1975) (citing Comment, The Decline of the Purchaser–Seller Requirement
of Rule 10b–5, 14 VILL. L. REV. 499 (1969)); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 830 n.7
(1974) (citing Warren E. Burger, Our Options Are Limited, 18 VILL. L. REV. 165, 167
(1972)).  Chief Justice Burger’s article was cited in another case decided the same
day as Pell. See Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 861 n.7 (1974); see also FTC v.
Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 240 (1972) (citing Eugene R. Baker &
Daniel J. Baum, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act: A Continuing Process of
Redefinition, 7 VILL. L. REV. 517 (1962)); SEC v. Med. Comm. for Human Rights,
404 U.S. 403, 409, n.4 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Arthur Selwyn Miller,
Toward the “Techno—Corporate” State?—An Essay in American Constitutionalism, 14
VILL. L. REV. 1 (1968)); Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers, Local Union No. 1 v.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 181 n.20 (1971) (citing Archibald Cox,
The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REV. 151, 157–59 (1957)); Labine v. Vin-
(393)
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in academe call a teachable moment—especially in the context of a law
review symposium.  Accordingly, I can say that this Article is about the one
Supreme Court case that properly cites to VLR.  But it is a very important
case for many reasons—both professional and personal.
Before I dig any deeper into Bestfoods, I should note that the piece
cited therein by the Supreme Court (per Justice Souter) is an article by
Richard G. Dennis, Liability of Officers, Directors and Stockholders Under
CERCLA: The Case for Adopting State Law.4  CERCLA is the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, a fed-
eral statute that establishes the so-called Superfund.5  Simply stated, the
Superfund was established to cover the costs of cleaning up hazardous
waste sites.  But after doing so, the fund may then seek reimbursement
from the responsible parties in order to repeat the process.6
The Dennis piece is one that might be described as a classic battleship
article of the sort a junior faculty member might publish to impress a ten-
ure committee.7  But the author was a practicing lawyer at Weil, Gotshal &
Manges in Houston, Texas, when the piece was published.  And he re-
mains a practicing lawyer today with AT&T in Bedminster, New Jersey.
The article runs 145 pages in print and appears to digest every
CERCLA decision rendered before its publication that addressed the issue
of whether officers, directors, and stockholders of companies found liable
under CERCLA may also be held liable either under the statute itself or
under the common law of piercing the corporate veil (PCV).  Dennis first
analyzes CERCLA cases addressing direct (statutory) and indirect (PCV)
theories of liability.  He then analyzes both federal and state common law
as to direct and indirect liability of officers, directors, and stockholders—
using California, New York, and Texas as representative states.  Finally, he
cent, 401 U.S. 532, 545 n.10 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing George A.
Pelletier & Michael Roy Sonnenreich, A Comparative Analysis of Civil Law Succession,
11 VILL. L. REV. 323 (1966)); Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 344 n.5 (1964)
(citing Cox, supra, at 172–75).
4. 36 VILL. L. REV. 1367 (1991) (note the spaces).
5. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2012).  The word super was used to excess in
the 1980s, much as the word awesome has been used to excess in the 2000s.
6. CERCLA is a remarkable legal innovation.  By establishing the Superfund
with an independent existence and standing to seek replenishment against pol-
luters, Congress effectively founded an enterprise whose business was to invest in
cleanup projects.  The one flaw in the model is that the Superfund can never do
better than break even. Cf. Bartle v. Home Owners Coop., 127 N.E.2d 832 (N.Y.
1955) (declining to pierce corporate veil (PCV) where subsidiary construction con-
tracting business had been operated so as to break even over vigorous dissent argu-
ing failure to seek profits is sufficient justification for PCV).  Nevertheless, the
Superfund is an important step in the direction of addressing the problem of so-
cial cost (as it has been called). See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1960); Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243
(1968), available at http://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/162/3859/1243
.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3MA-N5AJ].
7. Thanks to my former Maryland colleague Ted Tomlinson for this
construction.
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analyzes the differences between these two bodies of law, that is, CERCLA-
specific law and the more general law of officer–director–stockholder
(ODS) liability.8
Dennis drills down deepest in identifying five different rules adopted
by the various federal courts of appeal but ultimately concludes that there
is little difference among them.  Moreover, and more important, he con-
cludes that the courts in CERCLA cases had (as of 1991 when the article
appeared) largely dispensed with the traditional requirement for both di-
rect and indirect ODS liability that plaintiffs demonstrate some sort of in-
equity visited upon the victim.  Rather, the courts appear to have been
satisfied with a showing that the defendant had the power to prevent the
harm.
This subtle shift may have been attributable to the fact that the
United States—rather than a private party—was the plaintiff in such cases.
It is difficult for a regulator to argue from equity since economic interests
inure to private parties.  Then again, CERCLA is different because of the
Superfund.
Having identified a material difference in the two approaches, Dennis
then proceeds to apply the test laid down by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.9 to determine whether the federal courts should
develop their own law in this area—or rather should continue to do so.
Not surprisingly, the author answers each of the Kimbell Foods questions so
as to militate against the need for a federal standard:
Question: Is there need for uniformity? Answer: NO
Question: Will state law frustrate federal goals? Answer: NO
Question: Will federal standard disrupt commerce? Answer: YES.
Accordingly, Dennis concludes that these issues should be resolved under
state law.  The Supreme Court seems largely to have agreed, arguably be-
cause of Dennis.  But to explain, we need to consider the facts of the case.
The central issue in Bestfoods was whether a parent corporation could
be held liable for the actions of a wholly-owned subsidiary resulting in the
pollution of soil and groundwater.  Specifically, the offending subsidiary
was Ott Chemical Company (Ott I), a publicly traded Michigan corpora-
tion.  Ott I was founded by Arnold Ott in 1957.10  The company, which
8. Curiously, and quite ironically as it turned out, Dennis missed one of the
relatively few pieces expressly to address officer liability. See Christine White
Booth, Real Persons, Corporate Persons and Vicarious Liability, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
453 (1988).
9. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
10. Arnold Ott owned 30% of the common stock of Ott I. See CPC Int’l, Inc.
v. Aerojet–General Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 557 (W.D. Mich. 1991), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part sub nom. United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 59 F.3d 584 (6th Cir.
1995), and aff’d in part, rev’d in part en banc sub nom. United States v. Cordova
Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 1997), vacated sub nom. Bestfoods v. Aerojet-
General Corp., 524 U.S. 924 (1998).  “[T]he next largest stockholder owned only
about 5%” of the common stock. Id.  So Arnold Ott was quite clearly the control-
3
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was located near Muskegon, Michigan, was engaged in the production of a
variety of synthetic organic intermediate chemicals used for pharmaceuti-
cal, veterinary, and agricultural purposes—including phosgene.11  In
1965, Ott I was bought by Corn Products Company, which later changed
its name to CPC International, Inc. and still later to Bestfoods (after a
spinoff).  (For purposes of this Article, I use CPC to refer to all.)12
Shortly after Ott was acquired by CPC, one William Turner White, Jr.
joined Ott as Vice President for Manufacturing, eventually rising to presi-
dent (but not CEO) of the company.  White grew up in Wilmington, Dela-
ware and was a member of the Dartmouth College class of 1944.13
Thereafter, White worked at DuPont, based first in New York and then in
ling stockholder.  Accordingly, he served as president and CEO of the company.
See id.  He also sat on the board of directors—which he chaired for a time. See id.
In addition to Arnold Ott, James Eiszner served as vice president of marketing and
apparently sat on the Ott I board of directors, as well. See id.  In 1963, Alexander
McFarlane—who was the chairman of the board of directors of Corn Products
Company (CPC), a publicly traded company based in New York City—joined the
Ott I board of directors. See id.  McFarlane was quickly impressed by the Ott man-
agement team and in 1965 began to talk with Ott about the possibility of CPC
acquiring Ott I and having Ott and Eiszner join the CPC management team. See
id.  As a result, Ott and Eiszner moved to New York (or New Jersey). See id.  In New
York, Ott worked closely with Harold Hellman, who was assistant to the CPC chair-
man. See id.  Ott also occupied several high-level officer positions with CPC. See id.
Eiszner went on to become CEO of CPC. See id. at 558.  Harold Hellman may have
been related to the mayonnaise Hellmanns, whose family business was bought by
Bestfoods (of California) in 1932.  Bestfoods acquired Rosefield Packing Company
(makers of Skippy Peanutbutter) in 1955, and Bestfoods itself was acquired by CPC
(then called Corn Products Refining Company and makers of Mazola Corn Oil,
Karo Syrup, and Argo Cornstarch) in 1958.  (Waste not. Want not.)  In 1997, CPC
split into two companies, CPC and Bestfoods.  Bestfoods was then bought by
Unilever in 2000.
11. Although phosgene was used as a poisonous gas in in World War I and
thus retains a dicey reputation, it is today widely used in the manufacture of
pharmaceuticals.
12. Technically, CPC formed a subsidiary (hereinafter Ott II), which bought
the assets of Ott I and assumed designated liabilities thereof. See CPC Int’l, Inc., 777
F. Supp. at 557.  But Ott I remained liable for all other liabilities, including those
for wrongful acts such as environmental harms. See id.  Ott I remained in existence
and maintained liability insurance for three years under the new name Muskegon
Chemical Company—but it did not operate as a business. See id. at 558.  In the sale
of assets transaction, CPC issued 75,300 CPC shares to Ott I in exchange for sub-
stantially all of the assets of Ott I. See id. at 557.  This deal structure would later
prove important since it left Ott I with nothing but an interest in its own parent
company—and little or no cash despite having retained significant liabilities. See
id. at 578.  Presumably, the CPC shares were either distributed in kind to Ott I
stockholders or sold and the cash so distributed.
13. White’s mother always referred to the school as that awful Dartmouth, sug-
gesting that its reputation for rowdiness—famously depicted in the movie Animal
House—was well-established some time ago. Cf. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Wood-
ward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819) (wherein Daniel Webster famously stated during oral
argument that it is “a small college.  And yet there are those who love it.”), tran-
script of oral argument available at https://www.dartmouth.edu/~dwebster/
speeches/dartmouth-peroration.html [https://perma.cc/5VS6-TRKK].
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Chicago.  He resigned from DuPont because the prospects of rising much
further in the company seemed to be dim.  In addition, with two daugh-
ters nearing college-age, moving to Michigan to take the Ott job would
mean in-state tuition at the University of Michigan.  I know all of this be-
cause White was my father-in-law.
In 1972, CPC sold the Ott facility to Story Chemical Company, a Geor-
gia corporation.14  White resigned almost immediately thereafter, follow-
ing a meeting with Story executives in which he was apparently presented
with some sort of ultimatum to the effect that he would need to go along
to get along.  Thereafter, White was unemployed for more than a year.  He
nevertheless dressed in a classically-tailored suit every day of the workweek,
most of which he spent in his home office.  In 1973, White acquired a 60%
interest in Webb Chemical Services Corporation in Muskegon Heights—
which he operated as a model of environmental responsibility for the next
eight years.
Meanwhile, back at Story Chemical, according to the district court
opinion in Bestfoods, the company (as of 1974) was “beset by financial
problems[ ] [and] abandoned regular use of the purge well system in-
stalled during the Ott II era to eliminate contaminants from the ground-
water.  This abandonment increased the spread of contamination
migrating away from the site.”15
Story operated the facility until 1977, when it was adjudicated bank-
rupt.16  The Ott site was acquired by Cordova Chemical Company of Cali-
fornia (a subsidiary of Aerojet-General Corporation) in 1976 or 1977 in
cooperation with the Michigan Department of Natural Resources
(MDNR) as part of an effort to salvage some value from the facility and to
clean up the site.17  It was so operated until 1986.
Although Bestfoods arises under CERCLA, most of the events outlined
here occurred before the enactment thereof in 1980.  The Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) did not become involved in cleanup efforts until
1981—the same year that White died in a plane crash.  And it was not until
14. This is according to the Supreme Court, whose use of the word facility
suggests that the transaction may have been a conveyance merely of the site. See
Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 57.  More likely, the transaction was a sale of the Ott business
by a sale of assets (rather than a merger).  No doubt the Court characterized the
transaction as a sale of the facility because facility is the word used in CERCLA.
15. CPC Int’l, Inc., 777 F. Supp. at 562.
16. See id.
17. The MDNR is now known as the Michigan Department of Environmental
Quality (MDEQ).  It is worth noting that Michigan was, at the time, the one and
only state found by the federal EPA to be sufficiently vigilant and competent to
handle its own environmental protection affairs without the assistance of the fed-
eral government.  The intervention by the EPA in the efforts of the MDNR con-
jures the image in the movie Dog Day Afternoon, where the FBI intervenes in a
hostage situation that seems to be well under control by the NYPD by displaying a
badge much as one might display a cross to a vampire: In hoc signo vinces.  The FBI
agent might well have stated: “I am from the government, and I am here to help.”
To add insult to injury, the MDNR was named as a defendant in Bestfoods.
5
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1989 that the EPA sued CPC, Aerojet/Cordova, and Arnold Ott (who set-
tled on the eve of trial), as well as MDNR.
The fifteen-day bench trial (in 1991) focused solely on whether CPC
and Aerojet could be held liable in their capacities as parent corporations.
The Dennis article appeared that same year.  But it was not until 1998 that
the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Bestfoods.
There was little doubt in the case that the subsidiary corporation
(Ott) itself could be held liable under CERCLA for the cost of cleaning up
the hazardous waste site.  Indeed, the parties appear to have stipulated as
much.18
In the absence of CERCLA, the question of parent liability would in-
volve a straightforward application of the law relating to PCV.  To be sure,
PCV law itself is anything but straightforward.  But CERCLA provides that
liability extends to “any person who at the time of disposal of any hazard-
ous substance owned or operated any facility . . . .”19  So the question is
whether the statute means something more than or at least different from
PCV.
Before Bestfoods, various courts had answered this question in various
ways.  In some cases, the courts applied PCV law—either as borrowed from
the states or developed under federal common law.  In some cases, the
courts construed the phrase “owner or operator” independently under the
statute.  And in some cases, the courts did both.  All of this is well docu-
mented in the Dennis piece, which had become a virtual bible on the
subject for environmental litigators.20
The trial court—the Western District of Michigan, Douglas W. Hill-
man USDJ (Senior)—held the parent corporation liable as an operator
(under the statute) because of exerting power or influence over the sub-
sidiary by actively participating in and exercising control over the subsidi-
ary’s business during a period of hazardous waste disposal.21  While the
court stated that statutory operator liability was broader than PCV, the
court also stated that mere oversight consistent with investment relation-
ship does not give rise to operator liability.22
Although the court did not attempt to define the space between the
two standards, it seems clearly to have held that operator liability may ob-
tain in some cases even though liability under PCV would not obtain.  Nev-
ertheless, the court applied essentially the same standard (perhaps minus
the requirement of inequity) in holding that the parent here was liable as
an operator as that word is used in CERCLA.
18. See  CPC Int’l, Inc., 777 F. Supp. at 556.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (2012) (emphasis added).
20. This is according to Villanova University School of Law alumnus Charlie
Howland (VLS 1985), who litigated many such cases at the time and was in attend-
ance at the Shachoy conference where this paper was presented.
21. See CPC Int’l, Inc., 777 F. Supp. at 571–76.
22. See id. at 573.
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Sitting en banc, the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that statutory op-
erator liability can obtain only by PCV and that the test for PCV under
Michigan law had not been met.23
The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of a conflict among
the circuits.  The Fifth and Sixth Circuits had ruled that a parent corpora-
tion could be held liable only on grounds of PCV.  The First, Second,
Third, and Eleventh Circuits had held a parent corporation could be held
liable directly as an operator under the statute.  And the Fourth Circuit,
ever the renegade on such matters, had held that a parent corporation
could be held liable only if it had authority to operate the facility.24
As one might have predicted, the Supreme Court reversed the hold-
ing of the Sixth Circuit.  (Why grant certiorari just to affirm a lower
court?)  In a unanimous opinion by Justice Souter, the Court sided essen-
tially with the majority of circuits.  The Court ruled that, although the
Sixth Circuit was correct that a parent corporation could be held indirectly
liable only on grounds of PCV, it was wrong that a parent corporation
could be held liable only in this way since the parent corporation could
have operated the facility itself.25
According to the Supreme Court, no one challenged the holding by
the Sixth Circuit that a case for PCV had not been established.  Neverthe-
less, the Court noted—in a lengthy footnote—significant disagreement
among courts and commentators over whether state or federal (common)
law of PCV should be applied, citing only Dennis as clear authority for the
idea that state PCV law should apply.  Admittedly, the Sixth Circuit seems
so to have held in Bestfoods itself, but it did so without any analysis.26  Still,
the Sixth Circuit’s statement that state PCV law governed and (implicitly)
that the standard thereunder had not been met must be seen as more
than dictum under the circumstances.
So the Supreme Court was compelled to consider whether PCV was
the exclusive route to parent liability under CERCLA.  And but for the
Dennis piece, the Court might have considered more seriously the possi-
bility of affirmance.  But because Dennis so cogently argued for a state-by-
state approach under the Court’s own Kimbell Foods test, the Court came
face to face with the implications of reliance on PCV.  In other words,
Dennis may have helped induce the Court to rule as it did because of the
prospect of dealing with the alternative—a morass of conflicting multi-
factor tests developed by state courts—tests that are almost universally re-
garded as nebulous at best.  So we cannot really say that the Court relied
23. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 59–60 (1998).
24. See id. at 60 n.8.
25. The case was argued for the United States by Lois Shiffer, whom I got to
know as a staff attorney at the Center for Law & Social Policy (CLASP) in Washing-
ton when I spent an intensive semester there as a law student in 1975.
26. See United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572, 580 (6th Cir. 1997),
vacated sub nom. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
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on the Dennis piece in ruling as it did in Bestfoods.  Still, “they also serve
who only stand and wait.”27
Incidentally, this story is quite consistent with the thesis advanced by
my colleague Professor Todd Aagaard—at the same 2015 Norman
Shachoy conference where I presented this paper—to the effect that the
progress of environmental law since 1980 has depended on supplanting
various state law theories (such as nuisance)—which operated inconsis-
tently in addressing problems that were inherently interstate in nature—
with federal statutory law.28
In any event, the decision of the Supreme Court in Bestfoods focuses
solely on operator liability under the statute.  The essence of the Court’s
decision is that the Sixth Circuit was wrong that PCV is the only way to hold
a parent corporation liable because operator liability is an express and
independent theory under the statute.
This result seems so obvious that one wonders how the Sixth Circuit
could have gotten it wrong.  Presumably, a parent corporation could be
held liable on grounds of PCV even if the statute were utterly silent on the
matter (assuming that the subsidiary is liable on some theory) since a par-
ent can always be held liable on grounds of PCV.  But the statute extends
liability to anyone who is an owner or operator of an offending facility.  These
words must mean something.  So they must mean something in addition
to the possibility of PCV.
The phrase owner or operator is a minor variation on common usage.
Even non-lawyers may refer now and again to someone who owns and oper-
ates a business.  We all know what we mean when we say that Joe Blow owns
and operates the local hookah bar or vape shoppe—or phosgene mill.  Or
do we?
Before we dig into what it means to operate a business or facility, we
should pause to consider what it means to own a business or facility.  It
might mean merely to own the stock of a corporation that owns the facil-
ity.  Or it might mean to own the facility itself—to be the name that ap-
pears on the deed or in a contract with a supplier or customer.  This
question was not before the Court.  Nevertheless, the Court notes that
Congress could not have intended to abolish the corporate veil in such a
cavalier way.
The only question that was before the Court was whether the defen-
dant, Bestfoods, could be held liable as an operator.  But operator liability
is its own can of worms.  What exactly would it mean for a parent corpora-
tion to be an operator?  Clearly, operator liability requires more than own-
ership of stock.  Indeed, owner liability requires more than ownership of
stock.
27. Thanks to John Milton for this insight.
28. See Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Regulation and Environmental Rights, 61
VILL. L. REV. 385 (2016).
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol61/iss3/4
2016] PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL 401
The Court could have answered this question—what it means to oper-
ate a facility (or business)—by reference to agency concepts or by riffing
on what it means to participate in an activity to such an extent that one
may be liable for the consequences.29  Indeed, the Court toyed with this
possibility in noting that a saboteur may qualify as an operator.30
Rather than answer the question clearly posed, the Court resorted to
the time-honored tactic of making up a new question to answer using its
own dichotomy.  According to the Court, the question is not whether the
parent runs the subsidiary, but whether the parent runs (operates) the facil-
ity.31  But the answer to this question could almost be called off the wall.
As the Court then stated: “The critical question is whether, in degree and
detail, actions directed to the facility by an agent of the parent alone are
eccentric under accepted norms of parental oversight of a subsidiary’s
facility.”32
It is reasonably clear what the Court means by the word eccentric here.
But it is nonetheless a strange word to choose rather than using some
more conventional construction, such as inconsistent with the corporate norm
or something similar.  Again, it could well be that the Court wanted to be
clear that the rule of the case would be seen as federal law and not the
application of a borrowed state law standard.
Note also that this holding effectively moots the PCV question.  By
focusing the inquiry on operation of the facility, the Court renders the
PCV question irrelevant.  Although it remains possible to extend liability
to the parent corporation by PCV, proving that the parent operated the
facility to the extent of eccentricity overlaps little (if at all) with making
out a classical case of PCV.  Rather, it conjures an image of meddling more
than manipulation.
In any event, having answered its own question, the Supreme Court
engages in a little postmortem about how the lower courts went wrong.  In
other words, the Court sees this as its teachable moment.
According to the Supreme Court, the district court confused itself by
focusing on directors and officers who wore multiple hats.  (Perfectly nor-
mal.  Nothing wrong with that.33)  But the Sixth Circuit overreacted by
29. See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 65; cf. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scien-
tific–Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008) (holding that participation in securities
fraud requires speaking to public).
30. See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 65; cf. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States,
398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J.) (holding Coast Guard liable for vandal-
ism by drunken seaman even though owner of vandalized property could have
prevented damage at less expense by installing lock and thus should have been
denied recovery under Coase Theorem).
31. See Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 68.  I am reminded here of a question that White
himself was quite fond of posing: Do you walk to school or carry your lunch?
32. Id. at 72 (emphasis added).
33. For example, a stockholder—even a controlling stockholder—may also be
a creditor of the corporation—not to mention a director or officer thereof—de-
spite the fact that such dual roles may raise questions about whether the stock-
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limiting the concept of operator to a joint venture with the subsidiary.
(Or so says the Supreme Court).  It could be that an agent of the parent
corporation—with only one hat to his name—pulled all the strings.  Of
course, one might say that a puppeteer wears yet another hat.  But that
might be an overuse of metaphor.  The Supreme Court decides where the
metaphors end.
To be fair, both the trial court and the Sixth Circuit saw their deci-
sions twisted by the Supreme Court, presumably because the Supreme
Court wanted to speak on the subject.  The district court probably thought
it had found operator liability (pretty much as thereafter defined by the
Supreme Court) without the need to resort to PCV.  And the Sixth Circuit
probably thought the trial court had mistakenly done just that.  So the
Supreme Court had an opening to say that both lower courts were wrong.
On the other hand, the statement by the Supreme Court that the
Sixth Circuit was correct in stating that PCV is the only way the parent can
be held liable indirectly seems quite gratuitous.  It could be intended to be
tautological.  PCV may refer simply to the result that the parent is liable for
the sins of the child.  But one could argue (and many would) that PCV
refers to a particular theory of parent liability—however ill-defined it may
be.  In other words, there may be other theories.  For example, the parent
may have deputized the subsidiary as its agent for pursuing the business
purposes of the parent.34  Or the parent may have been in partnership
with the subsidiary and, as a partner, would be held jointly and severally
liable for any wrongful act of the partnership.35  Indeed, the Sixth Circuit
itself suggested that a parent could be liable if engaged in a joint venture
with the subsidiary.
To be fair to the Sixth Circuit, while this is the only example it men-
tions, that does not necessarily mean that it held it was the only way the
parent could be held liable indirectly.  I would argue that PCV should be
seen as a generic term that comprises all of these theories—including per-
haps operator liability.  The Dennis piece more or less proves the point in
identifying at least five different approaches to PCV in five different cir-
cuits.  Indeed, I would argue that PCV is not really a theory of liability at
holder as creditor has been unduly favored by the stockholder as stockholder. See,
e.g., In re Lifschultz Fast Freight, 132 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 1997); see also MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 6.40 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2003) (establishing test for determining whether
stockholder debt is on par with outside creditor debt).
34. See, e.g., A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn.
1981); Booth, supra note 8. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 343
(1958).  Curiously, the Booth piece was not cited by Dennis (or the Supreme
Court), although it may be the only law review article to address officer liability in
any significant detail.  Incidentally, the author is the daughter of William T. White.
35. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 15 (1914); cf. Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6
(N.Y. 1966) (suggesting that separately incorporated taxicabs might be liable for
each other as partnership). See generally Richard A. Booth, Partnership Law and the
Single Entity Defense, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1 (2012) (discussing in context of
antitrust law idea that two or more corporations may function as partnership with
each other).
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol61/iss3/4
2016] PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL 403
all.  Rather it is a remedy.  Or more precisely a collection of remedies.
One might even say that it is merely a descriptor for the result that a parent
corporation is held liable for a harm or obligation that is primarily attribu-
table to another corporation—usually a subsidiary but not always.36
Nevertheless, I suspect that most practicing lawyers would say that it is
one thing to argue PCV and quite another to argue that a subsidiary has
been operated as the mere agent of the parent or as its partner or even as
an undercapitalized independent contractor.  In other words, most liti-
gators would argue that the Supreme Court’s statement that PCV is the
only way to establish indirect liability is significant in that it forecloses the
application of any other theory of indirect liability.  But it seems unlikely
that the Court would so blithely cut off so many lines of argument.  It
seems much more likely that the Court sees PCV as I do—as a collection of
theories or as a mere description of the remedy.
If so, one might also argue that operator liability is just another exam-
ple of PCV.  And it may be that the Sixth Circuit saw it so.  In other words,
the Sixth Circuit may have reasoned that if operator liability applies, PCV
will also apply.  Although that may almost always be the case, operator lia-
bility is different in that the subsidiary need not be involved at all in an act
giving rise to liability (except for the fact that it owns the facility).  Thus,
there may be some daylight between PCV and operator liability after all.
It is odd that lawyers and scholars and even judges so often lose track
of the simple proposition that an actor is liable for his/her/its own acts
36. Yet another collection of similar theories is the doctrine of successor lia-
bility, whereby a corporation that buys the assets of a tortfeasor corporation with-
out assuming the liabilities thereof may nonetheless be held responsible for such
liabilities.  See, e.g., Knapp v. N. Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974)
(noting bargain price suggests bad faith plan to avoid liabilities); Nissen Corp. v.
Miller, 323 Md. 613 (1991); see also LaFountain v. Webb Indus. Corp., 951 F.2d 544
(3d Cir. 1991); Conway v. White Trucks, 885 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1989); Ray v. Alad
Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22 (1977); Franklin v. USX Corp., 87 Cal. App. 4th 615 (2001)
(discussing product-line theory requiring virtual destruction of source of recov-
ery); Van Nocker v. A.W. Chesterton Co. (In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig.), 789 N.Y.S.2d
484 (App. Div. 2005) (discussing continuity of enterprise theory). But see N. Shore
Gas Co. v. Salomon Inc., 152 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 1998) (applying de facto merger
doctrine under CERCLA where offending business had been spun off from hold-
ing company), overruled on other grounds by Envision Healthcare, Inc. v. Prefer-
redOne Ins. Co., 604 F.3d 983 (7th Cir. 2010); Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d
75, 80 (3d Cir. 1986) (arguing that product-line theory is unprincipled because its
application is limited to products liability claims).  The district court in Bestfoods
considered these theories in the initial trial but declined to rule thereon unless it
became relevant to apportionment of damages. See CPC Int’l Corp. v. Aerojet-
General Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 575 (W.D. Mich. 1991), aff’d in part, rev’d in part
sub nom. United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 59 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 1995), and aff’d
in part, rev’d in part en banc sub nom. United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.3d
572 (6th Cir. 1997), vacated sub nom. Bestfoods v. Aerojet–General Corp., 524 U.S.
924 (1998).  On remand, the United States argued that the CPC purchase of Ott I
assets had constituted a de facto merger (presumably in part because the consider-
ation was CPC stock).  But given that CPC had divested itself of Ott, it would be
odd to do so.  And indeed, the trial court declined to do so. See Bestfoods v. Aer-
ojet–General Corp., 173 F. Supp. 2d 729 (W.D. Mich. 2001).
11
Booth: Close Encounters with Piercing the Corporate Veil
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016
404 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61: p. 393
that cause harm to third parties.  A banana vendor who incorporates his
one-man business and carelessly leaves discarded peels around his stand
gets no protection from the corporate veil as an employee of his own cor-
poration.  He may not be liable as a stockholder, but he is liable (if he
himself tends the stand) for the consequences of his own actions and inac-
tions.  And if a parent corporation uses—or, more precisely, utilizes—a
subsidiary corporation as its agent to act on behalf of the parent, the par-
ent is liable as if the parent did the deed. A fortiori, if the parent itself does
the deed using subsidiary property, the parent is liable.  As the Court
noted, the parent may assume direct control of a subsidiary facility without
the help or assistance or even permission of the subsidiary—just as a sabo-
teur might do.37
The point for present purposes—and the central thesis here—is that
the Supreme Court in Bestfoods wanted to encourage the development of a
unique body of federal law relating to parent–subsidiary relations in the
context of CERCLA (if not elsewhere).  So the obvious question is how has
the law evolved in the meantime?  Does PCV remain a frequently used
remedy?  Or has operator liability become the rule?  I cannot say for sure,
but it appears that PCV is alive and well and applied in some cases even
though operator liability does not obtain.38  Moreover, the courts con-
tinue to apply state law with regard to PCV.
Thus, Bestfoods seems ultimately to have been about semantics.  Or is it
heuristics?  Or maybe semiotics?  The case seems not to have made much
practical difference.  But I do not practice law.  I profess law.
37. For some reason, it can be difficult to maintain the idea that a corpora-
tion is a discrete entity (or person) that can have the same legal relationships that
other people can have.  On the other hand, it can also be difficult to keep in mind
that a corporation is nothing more than a collection of natural individuals who
have bound themselves together in an elaborate, largely standard form contract.
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
38. See N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. FirstEnergy Corp., 766 F.3d 212 (2d Cir.
2014) (PCV but no operator liability).
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